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[轉載] 致命的教訓:朝鮮戰爭—中美最後壹場戰爭(中英對照閱讀)

致命的教訓:朝鮮戰爭—中美最後壹場戰爭(中英對照閱讀)

譯文簡介:
說起中美之間最後壹場戰爭,也就是現在我們所說的朝鮮戰爭,這是壹場毫無意義的壹場戰爭,這場戰爭所帶來的感受,現在都已忘卻的差不多了,對於華盛頓和北京兩方的決策者來說這是壹個都該吸取的沈重的教訓。

譯文來源原文地址:http://nationalinterest.org/feat ... war-11558?page=show

Deadly Lessons: The Last Time China and America Went to War

致命的教訓:中美最後壹場戰爭



There was nothing good aboutthe last Sino-American War, or what we today call the Korean War. Theexperience of this war, now nearly forgotten, should serve as a grim lesson forpolicy makers in both Washington and Beijing.

說起中美之間最後壹場戰爭,也就是現在我們所說的朝鮮戰爭,這是壹場毫無意義的壹場戰爭,這場戰爭所帶來的感受,現在都已忘卻的差不多了,對於華盛頓和北京兩方的決策者來說這是壹個都該吸取的沈重的教訓。

In November 1950,China and the United States went to war. Thirty-six thousand Americans died,along with upwards of a quarter million Chinese, and half a million or moreKoreans. If the United States was deeply surprised to find itself at war withthe People’s Republic of China, a country that hadn’t even existed the yearbefore, it was even more surprised to find itself losing that war. The openingChinese offensive, launched from deep within North Korea, took U.S. forces bycomplete operational surprise. The U.S.-led United Nations offensive into NorthKorea was thrown back, with the U.S. Army handed its worst defeat since theAmerican Civil War.
The legacies ofthis war remain deep, complex and underexamined. Memory of the KoreanWar in the United States is obscured by the looming shadows of World War II andVietnam. Chinaremembers the conflict differently, but China’s position inthe world has changed in deep and fundamental ways since the 1950s. Still, aswe consider the potential for future conflict between China and the UnitedStates, we should try to wring what lessons we can from the firstSino-American war.

1950年11月,中美開戰。美軍死亡3萬6千多人,中國死亡超過25萬人,至少50萬朝鮮人喪生。這場與中國的戰爭令美國深感震驚,震驚的是的是這場戰爭居然輸給了壹個剛成立壹年的國家。中國初入朝鮮便立即展開了攻勢,完全出乎美軍的意料。進而擊退了深入北朝鮮的以美國為首的聯合國軍,美軍遭遇到自美國內戰以來最慘痛的壹次失敗。

戰爭遺留下的問題是深刻,復雜、令人深入反思的。印象中的朝鮮戰爭比二戰和越南戰爭要模糊的多,但中國的這次戰鬥與以往不同的是,它讓中國的國際地位自50年代起發生了深刻而根本性的改變。然而,當我們在考慮中美間在未來可能發生的沖突時,我們是否應從這次中美戰爭中總結出某種教訓。

Initiation


In early 1950, thepolitics of the Cold War had not yet solidified around a pair of mutuallyhostile blocks. Nevertheless, the contours were visible; the Soviets had spentseveral years consolidating control of Eastern Europe, and the ChineseCommunist Party had ridden the victories of the People’s Liberation Army topower in Beijing. The stage was set for a zero-sum interpretation of the globalstruggle between Communist and non-Communist powers. It was just such aninterpretation that dominated Washington’s thinking as North Korean forces escalatedthe Korean civil war with a massive invasionacross the 38th parallel.
Inside the United States, tensionover the collapse of Nationalist China remained high. The Nationalist government possessed anextremely effective public-relations machine in the United States, builtaround the Soong family’s relationship with Henry Luce. Thisinfluential domestic lobby helped push the United States towards bothintervention and escalation, while at the same time undercutting the advice ofexperts who offered words of caution about Beijing’s capabilities andinterests.
The initialChinese victories in late fall of 1950 resulted from acolossal intelligence failure on the part of the United States. These failures ranthe gamut from political, to strategic, to operational, to tactical.The politicization ofAmerican expertise on China following the establishment of the PRC meant thatU.S. policy makers struggled to understand Chinese messages. TheUnited States also misunderstood the complex relationship between Moscow,Beijing and Pyongyang, treating the group as unitary actor without appreciatingthe serious political differences between the countries.
On an operationallevel, advancing U.S. forces paid little heed to warnings of Chineseintervention. The United States failed to understand the importance of theNorth Korean buffer to Beijing, failed to detect Chinese preparations forintervention, failed to detect Chinese soldiers operating in North Korea andfailed to understand the overall strength of the Chinese forces. This lack ofcaution stemmed from several sources. The U.S. military, having had experiencewith Chinese Nationalist forces during World War II, hadlittle respect for the capabilities of the PLA, especially outside ofChinese borders. Americans overrated the importance of air superiority at thetactical and operational level, not to mention the relevance of nuclear weaponsat the strategic level.

啟示

1950年初,對於雙方敵對陣營,冷戰政治雖未形成,但已初具雛形,蘇聯耗時幾年的時間加強對東歐的控制,並且,解放軍在中共領導下取得了勝利,建立北京政權。共產主義與反共產主義在全球競爭舞臺上演繹了壹場零和遊戲,恰好在這種背景下,華盛頓主流思想認為,是北朝鮮突破38線實施大規模入侵(invasion),挑起朝鮮戰爭。
潰敗失意的國民政府在美國國內依舊活躍,國民政府對美國擁有壹套頗為有效的公關手段,宋氏家族與亨利盧斯關系緊密。這個有影響力的國內遊說團促使美國插手並擴大幹預,與此同時,專家團提出的有關北京潛力和利益的警告也被(刻意)忽視掉了。
中國在1950年秋末初勝的結局源於美國壹方,情報系統的巨大失誤,失誤包括政治,戰略,作戰,戰術等各個方面。對於中國,美國政治專家認為,隨著PRC的建立,美國決策者本應該盡力去了解中國人的想法,美國同時也曲解了莫斯科、北京、平壤之間復雜的關系,把他們當做壹個整體來對待,沒有意識到這些國家間嚴重的政治分歧
在操作層面,先進的美軍部隊沒把中國政府的警告當回事。美國未認識到解朝鮮作為北京緩沖區的重要性,未發現中國進行幹預的準備工作,未發現中國士兵在朝鮮的動作,未充分認識到中國軍隊的整體實力。這些疏忽源自幾個方面。(首先)在第二次世界大戰期間,美軍憑著國民黨軍隊的表現,揣度PLA的作戰能力,尤其是在中國境外的時候,(其次)戰略層面上在不考慮有關核武器的情況下,在戰術和作戰水平上美國人過高估計空中優勢的重要性。

Conduct


The People’sLiberation Army appreciated the significance of U.S. air superiority overthe battlefield, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. armor andartillery. The PLA (or PVA, as the expeditionary force in North Korea wasdubbed) attempted to fight with the hybrid insurgent tactics that ithad used to prevail in the Chinese Civil War. This involved using lightinfantry formations, designed to move and attack at night, in order to avoidU.S. airpower and concentrated American firepower. These tactics allowed thePLA to surprise U.S. forces, which were uncertain of the magnitude of Chineseintervention until it was too late to do anything but retreat.
Similarly, theUnited States fought with the tactics (and often the weapons) that it had usedin World War II. Although North Korean armor and artilleryhad outmatched unprepared U.S. ground forces in the opening weeks ofthe war, by the time of the Chinese counteroffensive, theUnited States was fielding mobile, armoredforces and employing combined arms tactics. These weapons andtactics allowed the United States to inflict severe losses on Chinese forces,even as it gave up wide swaths of territory.
The U.S. Air Forceand the U.S. Navy expected to conduct sea and air operations in what we nowrefer to as a permissive environment, without significant interference fromCommunist forces. The Navy was right; the Air Force was wrong. Expectingoverwhelming advantages in training and material,the U.S. air forces found cagey Communist forces equipped with the MiG-15interceptors, which could outfight American piston-engined aircraft and mostearly jets. Formations of B-29s attempted to conduct daylight precision bombingraids of North Korea, finding that MiG-15s could cut them to pieces. U.S.forces, fresh from the bloody organizational fights that had birthed the U.S.Air Force, also struggled to develop a compatible, cooperativeground-air doctrine. Still, despite the problems, the UnitedStates managed to establish and hold air superiority for most of the war, usingthat freedom to inflict severe damage on Chinese and North Korean forces,infrastructure and logistics.

組織實施

PLA在戰場上充分認識到美國空中優勢的重要性,以及美軍裝甲部隊和炮兵部隊的有效性。此時中國人民解放軍(或稱誌願軍)試圖用遊擊戰術,這種曾取得中國內戰勝利的戰術進行作戰。為了避免美國空軍、炮兵火力的集中打擊,他們利用輕裝部隊在夜幕掩護下實施機動和攻擊。解放軍利用這些戰術對美軍實施突襲,美軍始終無法確認中國參戰規模,直到反應過來,他們已經無影無蹤了。
與此同時,美國還在用二戰時的戰術(和常規武器)進行作戰。盡管在開戰的頭幾個星期,北朝鮮的裝甲和炮兵部隊戰勝幾乎毫無準備的美軍地面部隊,利用中國反攻之際,美國部署移動裝甲部隊並實施聯合作戰戰術。美軍的這些武器和戰術讓中國軍隊付了出慘重的代價,甚至讓他們丟掉了大片占領領土。
美國的空軍和海軍以為在海空戰場上應該很輕松,幾乎不會遇到來自共產主義軍隊的抵抗。海軍判斷是對的,空軍錯了。培訓資料裏認為有絕對優勢,但美國空軍發現GCD軍隊暗中裝備了米格-15截擊機,這種戰機可以擊敗美國活塞式戰鬥機和大部分早期型號的噴氣戰鬥機。B29轟炸機編隊打算在白天對北朝鮮實施精確轟炸,結果被米格15戰鬥機打得七零八落。美軍開始從這場殘酷的兵團作戰(吸取了教訓)重新組織美國空軍,同時努力打造壹個協同的,地空聯合的作戰理論。然而,盡管出現了這些問題,但在大部分戰鬥中美國仍掌握著制空權,這種制空權給中國及北朝鮮的基礎設施和後勤造成了巨大的損失。

Lessons andLegacies

The most importantlegacy of the first Sino-American War is the enduring division of the KoreanPeninsula. Following the exhaustion of the Chinese counteroffensive, neitherside really threatened to throw the other off the peninsula. The relationshipsbetween Seoul, Washington, Beijing and Pyongyang have changed mightily over theyears, but the conflict remains frozen along the geography established in1953.
Many of theproblems have stayed the same, despite the fundamental transformations thathave overtaken global politics. Beijing has grown tired of the antics of itsNorth Korean client, just as South Korea has grown significantly inwealth and power. But North Korea can still threaten the security andprosperity of the Republic of Korea, and threats to the DPRK are still felt inBeijing.

教訓與後患

第壹次中美戰爭所遺留下來的最大的問題是朝鮮半島長時間分裂。隨著中國攻勢出現疲態,雙方都承認無法把對方趕出朝鮮半島。時過境遷,漢城,華盛頓,北京、平壤之間的關系雖發生了巨變,但沖突仍擺在1953年畫出的那條線上。
盡管全球政治環境發生了天翻地覆的變化,但很多問題依然無法解決。恰逢南朝鮮財富和國力逐步大幅提升,北京逐漸厭倦了他這位行事怪異的朝鮮客戶。但北朝鮮仍能威脅到韓國的安全和繁榮,北朝鮮所受到的威脅北京也壹樣能感覺得到。

China and theUnited States remember this conflict much differently. For the United States,the Korean War represents an oddaberration; a war fought for justice, but withoutsatisfactory resolution. Americans’ most enduring memory of the conflict camethrough the television show M.A.S.H., which used the war as aproxy for talking about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Even this memory has begunto fade, however.
For China, the warrepresents a remarkable victory over imperialism in the face of overwhelmingodds. It introduced the People’s Republic of China to the international systemwith a (literal) bang. At the same time, the legacy of the war complicated China’sinternational situation. In part because of the memory ofChinese intervention, but also in combination with China’s domestic politics,the United States managed to keep the PRC isolated from the internationalsystem into the 1970s. Today, the PRC poses a quasi-imperial threat toneighbors all along its vast periphery, while at the same time representing oneof the three major tent-poles of the growing global economy.

回顧這次沖突,中美的看法截然不同。美國認為朝鮮戰爭是種錯覺(錯誤的戰爭);壹場正義之戰,卻沒有圓滿解決。壹直以來美國人對這場沖突的了解來自電視臺播出的《陸軍野戰醫院》電影。這部電影在討論美國介入越南時常把這場戰爭描繪成壹場代理戰爭,無論如何,即使這樣也沒給人留下什麽深刻印象。
對於中國來說,這是壹場在毫無勝算的情況下,戰勝帝國主義的偉大戰爭。伴隨著壹聲巨響,從此中華人民共和國屹立在世界之林(原文)。同時,這場戰爭給中國帶來復雜的國際環境。壹部分源於中國幹涉的印象,再加上中國國內的政治鬥爭,美國成功地在整個70年代把中國排除在世界體系之外。時至今日,中國以壹副準帝國的姿態仗著龐大的身軀欺壓周邊鄰居的同時,還成為了全球經濟三大支柱之壹。

Militarily, thepolitical, social and technological conditions that produced mass infantrywarfare in Korea in the 1950s no longer hold. The United States hasgrown accustomed to fighting opponents who excel in hybrid warfare,but the People’s Liberation Army has been out of that business for decades. Theground forces of the PLA are now transitioning between mechanized and postmechanizedwarfare, while the air and sea forces are in the process of perfecting theworld’s most extensive anti-access/area denial system. If conflict were tohappen again, China would challenge U.S. control of the air and seas in a waythat it never did during the Korean conflict.
The mostinteresting, useful lessons may involve botched war termination. TheKorean War dragged on for nearly two years after the settlement of the keystrategic issues became clear. Nevertheless, poor communicationbetween Washington and Beijing, combined with reputational concerns on bothsides, inflated minor issues—such as POW repatriation—andextended the war well beyond its productive limits. That the United Statesviewed its conflict with China as a proxy war complicated the problem, asAmerican policy makers became obsessed with the message that every action sent to theSoviet Union. Inany future conflict, even as political questions associated withescalation and reputation loom large, Beijing can likely count on havingWashington’s full, focused attention.      

在當今軍事,政治,社會和科技的環境下,不太可能出現1950年發生在韓國的那種大兵團作戰的場面。美國已習慣同擅長各種作戰方式的對手作戰,但近幾十年來解放軍卻幾乎沒怎麽打過仗(缺少經驗)。中國軍隊現在正向現代與後現代戰爭之間做轉變。同時正把海空力量逐步打造成世界規模最大的反介入、區域拒止系統。如果戰事再起,中國會在某種程度上將向美國所控制的,在朝鮮戰爭中從未涉獵過的海空領域,發起挑戰。
最有意思的是,有益的經驗或許能終止戰爭。對於朝鮮戰爭,在關鍵戰略問題上達成和解之前,拖拖拉拉打了近兩年。然而,華盛頓和北京之間卻很少溝通,聯系到雙方都關心的聲譽問題,壹些小事被化大——如戰俘遣返問題——迫使戰爭擴大的因素遠大於有效遏制戰爭的因素。美國把同中國的這場沖突看做是壹個復雜的代理戰爭問題。美國決策者們迷信來自蘇聯的每壹個消息。在以後任何的沖突中,當相關政治問題激化到足以影響聲譽時, 北京或許能得到華盛頓的充分關註。

Conclusion

There was nothinggood about the last Sino-American War, not eventhe “peace” that resulted from it. The experience of this war, now nearlyforgotten on both sides, should serve as a grim lesson for policy makers inboth Washington and Beijing. The Korean War was anything but accidental, but miscalculation and miscommunication both extended andbroadened the war beyond its necessary boundaries.
Robert Farley isan assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and InternationalCommerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritimeaffairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination andThe Diplomat.

結論

這是中美之間壹場毫無意義戰爭,它甚至連“和平”都談不上。這場戰爭所帶來的教訓,雙方都已忘卻的差不多了,但這應該成為華盛頓和北京決策者兩方都應該吸取的慘痛教訓。朝鮮戰爭雖非偶然發生,但誤判的擴大和誤解加深突破了戰爭所應有的局限。

作者羅伯特法利

[ 本帖最後由 铁血64 於 2014-11-7 09:19 編輯 ]
別和我討論六四事件,因爲你檔次太低。
泉水叮咚89年北京暴亂澳門資料空間:
http://my.qoos.com/space-188504.html(大量64事件圖文資料)

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美國參戰起於釜山港,止於三八線。
中國參戰起於中朝鴨綠江,止於三八線。

按戰略目的看,中美都實現了基本目標,都沒拿下最高目標;
只有朝鮮,南北兩邊都希望統壹,但戰爭導致徹底分裂至今。

按傷亡人數看,誌願軍不能直和美軍對比,應該與整個聯合國軍對比才對.不過即使這樣兩方傷亡加起來,都不如朝鮮半島上的平民死得多。

所以,這場戰爭唯一的失敗者是朝鮮人民.而不是其他参战的国家.


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以下圖片来源於美國華盛頓朝鮮戰爭紀念公園--








[ 本帖最後由 铁血64 於 2014-11-7 14:13 編輯 ]
別和我討論六四事件,因爲你檔次太低。
泉水叮咚89年北京暴亂澳門資料空間:
http://my.qoos.com/space-188504.html(大量64事件圖文資料)

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