[轉載] 致命的教訓:朝鮮戰爭—中美最後壹場戰爭(中英對照閱讀)



譯文來源原文地址:http://nationalinterest.org/feat ... war-11558?page=show

Deadly Lessons: The Last Time China and America Went to War


There was nothing good aboutthe last Sino-American War, or what we today call the Korean War. Theexperience of this war, now nearly forgotten, should serve as a grim lesson forpolicy makers in both Washington and Beijing.


In November 1950,China and the United States went to war. Thirty-six thousand Americans died,along with upwards of a quarter million Chinese, and half a million or moreKoreans. If the United States was deeply surprised to find itself at war withthe People’s Republic of China, a country that hadn’t even existed the yearbefore, it was even more surprised to find itself losing that war. The openingChinese offensive, launched from deep within North Korea, took U.S. forces bycomplete operational surprise. The U.S.-led United Nations offensive into NorthKorea was thrown back, with the U.S. Army handed its worst defeat since theAmerican Civil War.
The legacies ofthis war remain deep, complex and underexamined. Memory of the KoreanWar in the United States is obscured by the looming shadows of World War II andVietnam. Chinaremembers the conflict differently, but China’s position inthe world has changed in deep and fundamental ways since the 1950s. Still, aswe consider the potential for future conflict between China and the UnitedStates, we should try to wring what lessons we can from the firstSino-American war.




In early 1950, thepolitics of the Cold War had not yet solidified around a pair of mutuallyhostile blocks. Nevertheless, the contours were visible; the Soviets had spentseveral years consolidating control of Eastern Europe, and the ChineseCommunist Party had ridden the victories of the People’s Liberation Army topower in Beijing. The stage was set for a zero-sum interpretation of the globalstruggle between Communist and non-Communist powers. It was just such aninterpretation that dominated Washington’s thinking as North Korean forces escalatedthe Korean civil war with a massive invasionacross the 38th parallel.
Inside the United States, tensionover the collapse of Nationalist China remained high. The Nationalist government possessed anextremely effective public-relations machine in the United States, builtaround the Soong family’s relationship with Henry Luce. Thisinfluential domestic lobby helped push the United States towards bothintervention and escalation, while at the same time undercutting the advice ofexperts who offered words of caution about Beijing’s capabilities andinterests.
The initialChinese victories in late fall of 1950 resulted from acolossal intelligence failure on the part of the United States. These failures ranthe gamut from political, to strategic, to operational, to tactical.The politicization ofAmerican expertise on China following the establishment of the PRC meant thatU.S. policy makers struggled to understand Chinese messages. TheUnited States also misunderstood the complex relationship between Moscow,Beijing and Pyongyang, treating the group as unitary actor without appreciatingthe serious political differences between the countries.
On an operationallevel, advancing U.S. forces paid little heed to warnings of Chineseintervention. The United States failed to understand the importance of theNorth Korean buffer to Beijing, failed to detect Chinese preparations forintervention, failed to detect Chinese soldiers operating in North Korea andfailed to understand the overall strength of the Chinese forces. This lack ofcaution stemmed from several sources. The U.S. military, having had experiencewith Chinese Nationalist forces during World War II, hadlittle respect for the capabilities of the PLA, especially outside ofChinese borders. Americans overrated the importance of air superiority at thetactical and operational level, not to mention the relevance of nuclear weaponsat the strategic level.




The People’sLiberation Army appreciated the significance of U.S. air superiority overthe battlefield, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. armor andartillery. The PLA (or PVA, as the expeditionary force in North Korea wasdubbed) attempted to fight with the hybrid insurgent tactics that ithad used to prevail in the Chinese Civil War. This involved using lightinfantry formations, designed to move and attack at night, in order to avoidU.S. airpower and concentrated American firepower. These tactics allowed thePLA to surprise U.S. forces, which were uncertain of the magnitude of Chineseintervention until it was too late to do anything but retreat.
Similarly, theUnited States fought with the tactics (and often the weapons) that it had usedin World War II. Although North Korean armor and artilleryhad outmatched unprepared U.S. ground forces in the opening weeks ofthe war, by the time of the Chinese counteroffensive, theUnited States was fielding mobile, armoredforces and employing combined arms tactics. These weapons andtactics allowed the United States to inflict severe losses on Chinese forces,even as it gave up wide swaths of territory.
The U.S. Air Forceand the U.S. Navy expected to conduct sea and air operations in what we nowrefer to as a permissive environment, without significant interference fromCommunist forces. The Navy was right; the Air Force was wrong. Expectingoverwhelming advantages in training and material,the U.S. air forces found cagey Communist forces equipped with the MiG-15interceptors, which could outfight American piston-engined aircraft and mostearly jets. Formations of B-29s attempted to conduct daylight precision bombingraids of North Korea, finding that MiG-15s could cut them to pieces. U.S.forces, fresh from the bloody organizational fights that had birthed the U.S.Air Force, also struggled to develop a compatible, cooperativeground-air doctrine. Still, despite the problems, the UnitedStates managed to establish and hold air superiority for most of the war, usingthat freedom to inflict severe damage on Chinese and North Korean forces,infrastructure and logistics.



Lessons andLegacies

The most importantlegacy of the first Sino-American War is the enduring division of the KoreanPeninsula. Following the exhaustion of the Chinese counteroffensive, neitherside really threatened to throw the other off the peninsula. The relationshipsbetween Seoul, Washington, Beijing and Pyongyang have changed mightily over theyears, but the conflict remains frozen along the geography established in1953.
Many of theproblems have stayed the same, despite the fundamental transformations thathave overtaken global politics. Beijing has grown tired of the antics of itsNorth Korean client, just as South Korea has grown significantly inwealth and power. But North Korea can still threaten the security andprosperity of the Republic of Korea, and threats to the DPRK are still felt inBeijing.



China and theUnited States remember this conflict much differently. For the United States,the Korean War represents an oddaberration; a war fought for justice, but withoutsatisfactory resolution. Americans’ most enduring memory of the conflict camethrough the television show M.A.S.H., which used the war as aproxy for talking about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Even this memory has begunto fade, however.
For China, the warrepresents a remarkable victory over imperialism in the face of overwhelmingodds. It introduced the People’s Republic of China to the international systemwith a (literal) bang. At the same time, the legacy of the war complicated China’sinternational situation. In part because of the memory ofChinese intervention, but also in combination with China’s domestic politics,the United States managed to keep the PRC isolated from the internationalsystem into the 1970s. Today, the PRC poses a quasi-imperial threat toneighbors all along its vast periphery, while at the same time representing oneof the three major tent-poles of the growing global economy.


Militarily, thepolitical, social and technological conditions that produced mass infantrywarfare in Korea in the 1950s no longer hold. The United States hasgrown accustomed to fighting opponents who excel in hybrid warfare,but the People’s Liberation Army has been out of that business for decades. Theground forces of the PLA are now transitioning between mechanized and postmechanizedwarfare, while the air and sea forces are in the process of perfecting theworld’s most extensive anti-access/area denial system. If conflict were tohappen again, China would challenge U.S. control of the air and seas in a waythat it never did during the Korean conflict.
The mostinteresting, useful lessons may involve botched war termination. TheKorean War dragged on for nearly two years after the settlement of the keystrategic issues became clear. Nevertheless, poor communicationbetween Washington and Beijing, combined with reputational concerns on bothsides, inflated minor issues—such as POW repatriation—andextended the war well beyond its productive limits. That the United Statesviewed its conflict with China as a proxy war complicated the problem, asAmerican policy makers became obsessed with the message that every action sent to theSoviet Union. Inany future conflict, even as political questions associated withescalation and reputation loom large, Beijing can likely count on havingWashington’s full, focused attention.      

最有意思的是,有益的經驗或許能終止戰爭。對於朝鮮戰爭,在關鍵戰略問題上達成和解之前,拖拖拉拉打了近兩年。然而,華盛頓和北京之間卻很少溝通,聯系到雙方都關心的聲譽問題,壹些小事被化大——如戰俘遣返問題——迫使戰爭擴大的因素遠大於有效遏制戰爭的因素。美國把同中國的這場沖突看做是壹個復雜的代理戰爭問題。美國決策者們迷信來自蘇聯的每壹個消息。在以後任何的沖突中,當相關政治問題激化到足以影響聲譽時, 北京或許能得到華盛頓的充分關註。


There was nothinggood about the last Sino-American War, not eventhe “peace” that resulted from it. The experience of this war, now nearlyforgotten on both sides, should serve as a grim lesson for policy makers inboth Washington and Beijing. The Korean War was anything but accidental, but miscalculation and miscommunication both extended andbroadened the war beyond its necessary boundaries.
Robert Farley isan assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and InternationalCommerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritimeaffairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination andThe Diplomat.




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